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Abstract
This paper develops a model that can explain why natural resources
are a curse for some countries, but not for others. In this model, natu-
ral resources cause fighting activities between rivalling groups. Fighting
reduces productive activities and weakens property rights, making pro-
ductive activities even less attractive. The aggregate production decrease
exceeds the natural resources’ direct positive income effect if and only
if the number of rivalling groups is sufficiently large. The model thus
predicts that natural resources lower incomes in fractionalized countries,
but increase incomes in homogenous countries. Empirical evidence that
supports this hypothesis is provided.
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1 Introduction
Since Sachs and Warner (1995) showed that economic growth is inversely re-
lated to various measures of resource abundance, the so-called curse of natural
resources has attracted considerable attention in the economic literature. Differ-
ent empirical studies confirm the findings of Sachs and Warner (1995). Different
theoretical contributions suggest explanations why natural resources might be
a curse.1
In most contributions, examples of countries that seem to suffer from a curse
of natural resources are given. Nigeria is often mentioned. Even though it has
enjoyed huge oil windfalls since the late 1960s, its per capita GDP in purchasing
power parity terms is among the lowest in the world and was even lower in the
year 2000 than it was in 1970.2 However, Nigeria is not representative for the
group of the oil-exporting countries. Many others including Iran, Mexico, Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela are considerably less poor and some small oil-rich states
are even relatively wealthy. In addition, Norway, one of the world’s largest oil-
exporters, grows at relatively high rates and is among the very richest countries
in the world. It is even richer than all its rich neighbors. So, the question arises
why oil-rich Norway is so successful while oil-rich Nigeria performs so terribly.
Alternatively, consider the diamond-rich neighbors Angola and Botswana.
Average incomes are more than six times higher in Botswana than in Angola
and property rights are considerably stronger too. This is hardly surprising
since Botswana has been one of the fastest growing countries in the last 40
years while there have been civil wars in Angola most of the time.3 But why
has diamond-rich Botswana performed so well while diamond-rich Angola has
been a disaster even in Sub-Saharan African terms?
Since the focus in the literature is mainly on explaining why natural resources
seem to be a curse (with respect to growth), existing contributions are generally
not well suited to explain these cross-country differences, i.e., to explain why
natural resources seem to be a curse for Angola and Nigeria, but a blessing for
Botswana and Norway. Therefore, our goal is to develop a theoretical model
that can explain the different impacts of natural resources in these different
countries.
This model focuses on rent seeking or, more general, on fighting activities
between rivalling groups. Natural resources and other windfall gains lead to an
increase in fighting activities if there are multiple rivalling groups. This leads
to a direct decrease of productive activities and weakens the property rights.
The weaker property rights make productive activities even less attractive such
that the aggregate production decrease exceeds the windfall gains’ direct pos-
itive income effect if the number of rivalling groups is sufficiently large. Thus,
natural resources are a curse in countries with many rivalling groups, i.e., in
fractionalized countries. This curse becomes more pronounced as fractional-
1For an overview, see Gylfason (2001) and Sachs and Warner (2001).
2For more information on Nigeria, see, e.g., Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003).
3For more information on Botswana, see Acemoglu et al. (2003). Note that Angola is not
only rich in diamonds, but also in oil.
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ization increases. In countries with few rivalling groups, on the other hand,
natural resources do not cause much fighting activities such that the positive
effect dominates. Natural resources are thus a blessing in such countries.
Our model is closest in spirit to Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and
Lane (1999), which also focus on rivalling groups that appropriate unsecured
property.4 However, there are some noteworthy differences: First, Lane and
Tornell assume common access to the whole (formal sector) capital stock; we
assume that private property is in general partly protected. Second, windfall
gains take exclusively the form of terms of trade shocks in Lane and Tornell’s
models while they can be of any kind in our model. Third, Lane and Tornell
focus on growth and we focus on incomes. Fourth, technological progress has the
same (negative) effect as a positive terms of trade shock in their models, but an
unambiguously positive effect in our model. Fifth, while economic performance
increases in the number of rivalling groups in their models if there are multiple
groups, it decreases in the number of rivalling groups in our model.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
Section 3 provides some evidence for hypotheses deduced from this model.
Among others, it shows that the income effect of natural resources decreases
and becomes increasingly negative as ethnic fractionalization increases. In ad-
dition, it provides some evidence that the negative growth effect of natural
resources might also increase in ethnic fractionalization. Section 4 concludes
and highlights that the presented model can account for the different effects of
natural resources in, e.g., Nigeria and Norway or in Angola and Botswana.
2 The Model
In this section, we present a simple non-cooperative one-shot game that allows
analyzing the effects of natural resources and fractionalization on property rights
and incomes. First, we explain the setup of the model. Second, we derive the
reaction functions. Third, we determine the equilibrium and discuss the results.
2.1 The Setup
Given is a country that is endowed with the natural resources ω > 0. Somewhat
more general, ω could also include other windfalls gains such as unconditional
foreign aid payments.
This country is populated by n > 0 inhabitants and is endowed with the
inputs X > 0, which might be labor, human capital or physical capital.
4Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999) look at an economy with multiple
groups that have open access to the aggregate capital stock. In these models, each group
wants to acquire a greater wealth share by demanding more transfers if the terms of trade
improve. The higher transfers increase taxes and reduce the return on capital such that savings
decrease in Lane and Tornell (1996). If this negative effect exceeds the direct positive effect
of the terms of trade shock, the growth rate decreases. In Tornell and Lane (1999), the lower
return on capital leads to a capital reallocation to a less productive informal sector, where
capital is safe from taxation. As a consequence, the growth rate decreases.
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Further, there are k ≥ 1 rivalling groups. The number of groups k is taken
as exogenous, which corresponds to the assumption that group membership
is primarily determined by cultural and historical processes and might not be
the result of an optimal choice. This assumption does not seem to be crucial
if different groups reflect different ethnic tribes. It might be less innocent if
rivalling groups reflect different social classes or even different groups that have
been formed for joint rent seeking or joint fighting, respectively.
The k groups are assumed to be equally sized such that each group i = 1...k
is endowed with the inputs xi = Xk .
5 Each group i can allocate its inputs xi to
productive activities li and to fighting activities fi. Of course, it must hold that
fi + li = xi (1)
for all i = 1...k.
Each group i makes collectively rational decisions to maximize its income
ci = pyi + ri, (2)
where yi denotes the output group i produces and ri the rent it appropriates.
But group i can only keep the share p, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, of its production
output yi. The share p thus measures the effectiveness of the property rights.
Somewhat broader, it could be seen as a measure of economic freedom.6
Next, we introduce production and appropriation technologies. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the production technology is linear in the productive
activities li such that the production output of group i is given by
yi = ali, (3)
where a > 0.
Together with the natural resources ω, the shares of the groups’ production
outputs that are not protected by property rights constitute a common pool.
Hence, this pool’s content is given by
R = (1− p)
k∑
j=1
yj + ω. (4)
For the content of this common pool R, the k rivalling groups can compete.
Thereby, the technology for appropriation from the common pool is such that
5Fixing the aggregate inputs X and not inputs per group rules out that a certain amount of
natural resources ω has a different effect on a country with few groups than on a country with
many groups simply because there are more natural resources relative to aggregate inputs in
the former country than in the latter.
6Alternatively, p could be replaced by 1− τ , where τ denotes the tax rate. But we prefer
a broader interpretation since fighting activities shall not be restricted to take place only on
the (legal) political stage in this model.
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group i can appropriate the rent7
ri =
1
k
R if f1 = f2 = ... = fk = 0, (5)
=
fi∑k
j=1 fj
R otherwise.
As the production technology (3) is silent about how productive activities li
are transformed into output yi, the appropriation technology (5) is silent about
how the rent ri is appropriated. One might think of many different legal and
illegal means such as lobbying, bribing, litigations, confiscations, theft or even
warfare. To sum up, appropriation can be done by ”crime, war, and politics”
(Hirshleifer 1994, 2).
Since the property rights variable p measures the production share over which
the producing group does not involuntarily lose control, fighting activities fi
may well have a negative effect on property rights. Further, it seems plausible
that the negative effect of a certain amount of fighting activities tends to be the
stronger, the smaller the economy is. Therefore, we assume that the effectiveness
of the property rights is determined by
p = 1− 1
X
k∑
j=1
fj . (6)
This assumption implies that property rights are complete in countries in which
no inputs are devoted to rent seeking and fighting activities. Similarly, it implies
that property rights are terribly weak or, in fact, non-existent in countries in
which there are no engineers and no workers, but only lobbyists and gunmen that
try to appropriate resources. The dependence of the property rates’ effectiveness
p on the input share allocated to fighting activities is assumed to be linear for
simplicity.
Of course, property rights might also depend on other factors such as cul-
ture, legal traditions and constitutions. However, it is important to take into
account that the implementation of constitutions and laws is not exogenous to a
society and could thus be influenced by the behavior of powerful groups. As an
example, even though ”a number of Latin American countries patterned their
constitutions after that of the United States” (North 1988, 7), property rights
are considerably weaker in these countries than in the United States. Further-
more, we show in appendix A that the results remain similar if property rights
depend partly on exogenous factors and if fighting activities have thus a weaker
effect on property rights.
7This technology for appropriation from a common pool is used by Grossman (2001) and
might well have been inspired by Tullock (1980). Following Tullock, we could alternatively
assume that each group i gets the rent R with probability qi =
ri
R
and nothing with probability
1 − qi. If the groups were risk neutral, the result would be identical to the subsequently
derived except that only expected, but not actual incomes would be the same for all groups.
If the groups were risk averse, fighting efforts would be somewhat lower and expected incomes
consequently higher.
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Next, we solve the model. Thereby, we assume that the k groups play a
one-shot Cournot game. Hence, solving the model involves two analytical steps.
In a first step, all k groups choose simultaneously how to allocate their inputs xi
optimally to productive and fighting activities. This yields each group’s reaction
function. In a second step, these reaction functions interact to determine the
Nash equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium allocation of each group’s inputs, the
equilibrium effectiveness of the property rights and the equilibrium incomes.
2.2 The Reaction Functions
So, we derive as a first step the reaction function of each group i, i.e., the
fighting activities fi that maximize the income ci of group i given the other
groups’ fighting activities. Inserting equations (1), (3), (4), (5) and (6) into
equation (2) allows writing the income of group i as
ci =
(
1− 1
X
f−i
)
a (xi − fi) + fi
1
X
al−i +
fi
fi + f−i
ω, (7)
where f−i ≡
∑
j 6=i fj and l−i ≡
∑
j 6=i lj . Given equation (7), the reaction
function of group i can be shown to be
fRi (f−i) =
√
X
xi
ωf−i
a
− f−i.
Since xi = Xk for all i = 1...k, the reaction function can be simplified to
fRi (f−i) =
√
kωf−i
a
− f−i. (8)
2.3 The Equilibrium
In a second step, the interaction of all the groups’ reaction functions determines
the Nash equilibrium.
Since the reaction function (8) holds for each group i = 1...k, it must hold
in equilibrium that
k∑
j=1
fj =
√
kωf−i
a
(9)
for all i = 1...k. Hence, each group i must choose the same fighting activities
f∗i = f
∗ in equilibrium. Replacing fi by f∗ for all i = 1...k in equation (9) and
then solving for f∗ yields each group’s equilibrium fighting activities
f∗ =
(k − 1) ω
ka
(10)
if
(k − 1) ω
ka
≤ X
k
⇔ (k − 1) ω ≤ aX (11)
6
and f∗ = Xk otherwise. Subsequently, we assume that condition (11) holds.
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Each group’s equilibrium fighting activities f∗ increase therefore in the nat-
ural resources ω and in the number of rivalling groups k, but decrease in the
productivity a.
Equations (6) and (10) imply that the equilibrium effectiveness of the prop-
erty rights p∗ is
p∗ = 1− (k − 1) ω
aX
. (12)
Hence, property rights tend to be the stronger in equilibrium, the fewer rivalling
groups k, the less natural resources ω and the more aggregate inputs X there
are. Moreover, technological progress, i.e., an increase in the productivity a,
also tends to strengthen property rights since it makes productive activities
more attractive relative to fighting activities.9
Equations (1), (7) and (10) imply that each group’s equilibrium income is
c∗ =
1
k
[aX − (k − 2) ω] .
Consequently, equilibrium per capita incomes are
c
∗=
kc∗
n
=
1
n
[aX − (k − 2) ω] . (13)
Let us now discuss how these equilibrium incomes depend on the different
parameters. First, an increase in the number of rivalling groups k decreases
group incomes c∗ and per capita incomes c∗ since it increases the input shares
allocated to fighting activities. Hence, incomes would be highest if k = 1 or,
alternatively, if the k > 1 different groups colluded successfully.
Second, the income effect of the natural resources ω decreases in the number
of rivalling groups k. It is positive if k < kcrit, where kcrit = 2, and becomes
increasingly negative if k > kcrit.10 Hence, natural resources are a curse in rela-
tively fractionalized countries, but a blessing in relatively homogenous countries.
Third, technological progress increases equilibrium incomes.
Fourth, a rise in the aggregate inputs X increases the group incomes c∗. Its
effect on per capita incomes c∗ depends on the source of this rise. If X rises since
each inhabitant becomes better endowed (such that Xn increases), c
∗ increases.
If X rises due to an increase in the population size n (such that Xn remains
unchanged), the effect of natural resources ω on c∗ becomes weaker. Thus, c∗
increases (decreases) in this case if k > (<) kcrit.
8If condition (11) did not hold, the equilibrium effectiveness of the property rights would
be p∗ = 0 and each group’s equilibrium income c∗ = ω
k
.
9The importance of strong property rights for technological and economic progress is well
established in the literature. Complementary, this model suggests that causation could also
be reverse: Technological progress could strengthen property rights.
10Appendix A shows that the threshold kcrit is the higher, the weaker the effect of fighting
activities on property rights is.
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3 Empirical Evidence
The theoretical model presented in section 2 suggests, among others, the follow-
ing two hypotheses: First, property rights are negatively affected by the number
of rivalling groups and by the amount of natural resources relative to aggregate
inputs. Second, the effect of natural resources on incomes is the worse, the more
rivalling groups there are, i.e., the more fractionalized the country is.
In this section, we first discuss some measurement issues and provide then
evidence supporting these two hypotheses. Further, we test whether the growth
effect of natural resources also tends to become worse as fractionalization in-
creases.
3.1 Measurement Issues
Testing the abovementioned hypotheses requires, among others, proxies for the
natural resources, for the number of rivalling groups and for the property rights’
effectiveness. Since measuring these variables adequately seems difficult and
maybe even controversial, we discuss the proxies we use.11
3.1.1 Measuring Natural Resources
In the literature, many different measures of natural resources have been used.
Most of them, including the shares of primary exports or of mineral production
in either GDP or total exports, focus on natural resources that are currently
extracted or currently exported, respectively. But the rivalling groups’ behavior
in general and their fighting in particular depend most likely on actual as well
as on potential rents and, consequently, not only on the natural resources that
are currently extracted or exported. Therefore, we follow Gylfason (2001) and
use proxies that are based on the World Bank (1997) report ”Expanding the
Measure of Wealth”, which includes natural resources that can, in expectation,
be extracted in the future.12 This report estimates physical, human and natural
capital of 92 countries.
Gylfason (2001) uses the share of natural capital in the sum of physical,
human and natural capital (NCS), which might be a good proxy for natural
resources relative to aggregate inputs. As proxy for the natural resources ω, we
use per capita natural capital (NC). Unlike NCS, NC does not tend to be
lower in developed countries than in developing countries with the same natural
capital. Further, we use the estimates of per capita physical and human capital
(PHC) as proxy for the productivity-adjusted per capita inputs aXn .
In addition, we will use the share of primary exports in total exports (PXI)
in section 3.4.
11In addition, appendix B briefly describes all variables used in the subsequently presented
regressions.
12We are grateful to Thorvaldur Gylfason who mailed us the corresponding data file.
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3.1.2 Measuring Fractionalization
Measuring the number of rivalling groups in a certain country is difficult, espe-
cially, since countries might be divided into different groups for various reasons.
Different groups might reflect, e.g., different social classes, different interest
groups or different ethnic tribes.
Income and wealth inequality measures like Gini coefficients might be use-
ful to proxy the likelihood that there are at least two different social classes.
But they do not provide much information about the number of different social
classes.13 Further, there seems to be no measure that could appropriately cap-
ture fractionalization that is due to different groups that have been formed for
joint rent seeking or joint fighting, respectively.
Given these difficulties, we prefer to focus on ethnic fragmentation. We
therefore use the index of ethnic fractionalization (ETHN) as proxy for the
number of rivalling groups k. This index measures the probability that two
randomly selected individuals of a certain country belong to different ethnic
groups. Alesina et al. (2003) provide ETHN for all 92 countries that are
included in the World Bank (1997) report.
Further, Alesina et al. (2003) provide an index of linguistic fractionalization
(LANG) and an index of religious fractionalization (REL). We use these indices
to check the robustness of some results we obtain with ETHN .
3.1.3 Measuring Property Rights
Quantifying property rights is difficult too. Nevertheless, the Heritage Foun-
dation and the Fraser Institute provide indices of economic freedom that rate,
among others, property rights.
The Heritage Foundation’s ”2003 Index of Economic Freedom” (O’Driscoll
et al. 2003) assesses economic freedom in 156 countries. Among those are
all countries included in the World Bank (1997) report, except Burundi and
Papua New Guinea. The Heritage Foundation rates ten categories important
for economic freedom, including property rights, with a score between 1 and
5 with low scores standing for institutions and policies that support economic
freedom. The average score yields the index of economic freedom.
Since the property rights variable p of the theoretical model seems close in
its meaning to the Heritage Foundation’s rating of the property rights (PRH)
and to its index of economic freedom (EFH), we use PRH as well as EFH.
The Fraser Institute’s ”Economic Freedom of the World: 2003 Annual re-
port” (Gwartney and Lawson 2003) assesses economic freedom in, among others,
85 countries included in the World Bank (1997) report. It incorporates compo-
nents of five categories including ”the legal structure and the security of property
rights” (PRF ). Each category is ranked with a score between 1 and 10 with
13The relationship between the number of different social classes and the Gini coefficient,
for instance, might well be hump-shaped. If the Gini coefficient is zero, there is only one social
class. If it is one, there are exactly two different social classes (with the upper class counting
only one member). However, if the Gini coefficient is in-between, there might well be more
than two different social classes.
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high scores implying institutions and policies that support economic freedom.
Again, the average score yields the economic freedom rating (EFF ). Subse-
quently, we use PRF and EFF to check the robustness of results we obtain
with PRH and EFH.
3.2 Estimating Property Rights
The theoretical model or equation (12), to be more precise, suggests that prop-
erty rights are the stronger, the fewer rivalling groups and the less natural re-
sources relative to the productivity-adjusted aggregate inputs there are. In this
section, we provide evidence that supports this hypothesis. But we also mention
that some results could be driven by the omission of geographical variables.
Columns (1.1) and (2.1) on tables 1 and 2 present the results from regressing
PRH and EFH on ETHN and NCS. All coefficients have the predicted
positive sign and are economically as well as statistically significant. These
findings suggest that property rights and economic freedom are indeed inversely
related to (ethnic) fractionalization and to the amount of natural resources
relative to aggregate inputs. These results are consistent with the theoretical
model’s prediction.
The remaining columns on tables 1 and 2 suggest that these findings are
fairly robust. Columns (1.2) and (2.2) show that the coefficients on NCS and
ETHN still have the predicted sign and are still significant if we replace PRH
and EFH by PRF and EFF .14 Columns (1.3) and (2.3) imply that the results
do not change considerably if we replace ETHN by LANG.15 In columns (1.4)
and (2.4), we replace NCS by NCPHC since the latter might be an even more
accurate proxy for the natural resources relative to aggregate inputs, which
equation (12) suggests to be relevant. The results remain significant.
However, the significant negative association between property rights and
(ethnic) fractionalization might just be the result of omitting geographical vari-
ables. La Porta et al. (1999) find that ethnolinguistic fractionalization has a
negative effect on property rights, which becomes insignificant if they control
for GNP per capita and for absolute latitude (LATI), i.e., the distance from
the equator. Similarly, the negative effect of ETHN and LANG on property
rights becomes also insignificant in Alesina et al. (2003) if they control for
LATI. The same holds true if we control for LATI in the regressions presented
in this section. That is, the coefficients on fractionalization become insignifi-
cant. Therefore, (ethnic) fractionalization might only be significantly related to
property rights and economic freedom since it captures some geographic char-
acteristics that directly affect property rights and economic freedom.16
14Remember that institutions and policies that support economic freedom get low scores in
the Heritage Foundation’s report, but high scores in the Fraser Institute’s report.
15The effects of REL on PRH and on EFH would be insignificant. The reason could
be that measured religious fractionalization is often low in unfree societies, as Alesina et al.
(2003) argue.
16But ”while one can think of several reasons why ethnic conflict may affect (...) institutions,
the relationship between latitude and (...) the protection of property rights seems much less
obvious” (Alesina et al. 2003, 169). Thus, LATI could just capture some effects of ETHN
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3.3 Estimating the Income Effect of Natural Resources
The theoretical model or equation (13), to be more precise, implies that per
capita incomes increase in the productivity-adjusted per capita inputs and that
the income effect of natural resources is positive in homogenous countries, but
becomes increasingly negative as the number of rivalling groups increases. In
this section, we provide evidence that supports these predictions. In particular,
we show that the income effect of natural resources becomes worse as ethnic
fractionalization increases.
Thereby, we measure incomes by the World Bank’s (2003) per capita gross
national incomes in the year 2000 in purchasing power parity terms (GNIP ).
Further, we use per capita gross national incomes derived by the Atlas method-
ology (GNIA) to check the robustness of our findings. In addition, we use the
dummy variable FRAC, which is one for countries with ETHN larger than the
mean and zero otherwise.17
All columns on table 3 show that the association between PHC, which serves
as proxy for the productivity-adjusted per capita inputs, and GNIP is positive
and highly significant. This finding, which the model predicts and common
sense suggests, holds in all regressions presented in this section.
Column (3.1) shows that the association between NC and GNIP is slightly
positive, but insignificant in the group of the ethnically homogenous countries
while it is negative in the group of the ethnically fractionalized countries. Fur-
ther, it shows that the effect of NC on GNIP is significantly more negative in
the fractionalized countries than in the homogenous countries.
The remaining columns provide further evidence that fractionalization wors-
ens the income effect of natural resources. In the regression presented in column
(3.2), the coefficient on NC is significantly positive while the coefficient on the
interaction term ETHN ∗ NC is significantly negative and about three times
larger in absolute values. This implies that natural resources have a positive
effect on incomes in ethnically very homogenous countries, but that this ef-
fect decreases in ETHN and becomes zero if ETHN is about one third. As
ETHN increases further, the income effect of natural resources becomes in-
creasingly negative. Column (3.3) shows that the coefficients on NC and on the
interaction term remain similar if we control for ETHN . In addition, columns
(3.4) and (3.5) show that the income effect of natural resources also decreases
in linguistic and religious fractionalization.
Table 4 shows that the finding that the income effect of natural resources
decreases in (ethnic) fractionalization is fairly robust. If we replace GNIP by
GNIA, the interaction terms between fractionalization and NC become even
significant at a 1% level in all specifications discussed above. Interestingly, the
same holds true if we control LATI and the interaction term LATI ∗ NC.
Further, the interaction terms between fractionalization and NC become also
on property rights since the correlation between ETHN and LATI is -0.53 in the sample of
the 92 countries included in World Bank (1997).
17The presented results would not change if FRAC were equal to one for countries with
ETHN larger than the median and zero otherwise.
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significant at a 1% level if we omit the developed countries and restrict the
sample to the 68 countries that are not members of the OECD.18
So, we find that incomes are positively related to physical and human capital
and, in ethnically homogenous countries, also to natural resources. Further, the
income effect of natural resources seems to decrease and to become increasingly
negative as (ethnic) fractionalization increases. These findings are consistent
with the theoretical model’s predictions.
3.4 Estimating the Growth Effect of Natural Resources
Since the theoretical model presented in section 2 is a one-shot game, there
can be no direct implications for growth. Nevertheless, we test in this section
whether the growth effect of natural resources becomes also worse as (ethnic)
fractionalization increases.
Sachs and Warner (1995) and many others use PXI to show that natural re-
sources have a negative effect on growth rates. We use PXI to test whether the
negative growth effect of natural resources becomes larger as ETHN increases.
We base this test on Sachs and Warner (1997), which is a revised version of
Sachs and Warner (1995), and their data. Column (5.1) on table 5 replicates
their regression (3.3). It implies that PXI is inversely related to the growth
rate even if it is controlled for initial GDP, openness, capital accumulation,
institutional quality and the development of the terms of trade.19
In column (5.2), we add the interaction term ETHN ∗ PXI. The effect
of PXI on the growth rate turns out to be insignificant in ethnically very
homogenous countries, but to become increasingly negative as ETHN increases.
As column (5.3) shows, the negative growth effect of PXI increases signifi-
cantly in ETHN even if we control for ETHN . Hence, ethnic fractionalization
might not only lower growth since it deteriorates public policy as suggested
by Easterly and Levine (1997), but also because it makes the growth curse of
natural resources worse.
However, this finding is not very robust. If we replace, e.g., ETHN by
LANG or PXI by the share of primary exports in GDP, the coefficients on the
interaction term and on fractionalization both become insignificant.20
So, there is some first, but not yet conclusive evidence that the growth
curse of natural resources might also become worse as (ethnic) fractionalization
increases.
18Further, the negative association between NCS and GNIP , which Gylfason (2001) finds,
becomes also significantly more negative as (ethnic) fractionalization increases. But since the
negative association between NCS and GNIP is primarily caused by a positive association
between PHC and GNIP , it is not obvious whether this finding also suggests that the income
effect of natural resources becomes worse as (ethnic) fractionalization increases.
19For more information on the variables used, see appendix B or Sachs and Warner (1997).
20Since NCS is not available for past times, replacing PXI by NCS would lead to results
that are difficult to interpret. In particular, the association between NCS and the growth
rate could be negative simply because NCS tends to be higher in slow growing countries.
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4 Conclusions
Remember that our goal is to explain why the impact of natural resources might
differ in different resource-rich countries such as Nigeria and Norway.
Nigeria is among the most fractionalized countries in the world with ethnic
fractionalization, as measured by the index of ethnic fractionalization, equal to
0.85. The different rivalling groups include the Hausa, the Yoruba and the Igbo.
Further, there are at least seven other ethnic groups with more than two million
members. The presented theoretical model suggests that oil windfalls cause
intensive fighting in such a fractionalized country. Further, it predicts that this
fighting weakens the property rights and lowers incomes since the production
decrease, which the fighting causes, exceeds the positive income effect of the oil
windfalls. Hence, the model predicts intensive fighting, weak property rights
and low per capita incomes for such a fractionalized, oil-rich country as Nigeria.
It is a tragedy that the reality confirms these predictions.
In Norway, on the other hand, ethnic fractionalization is only 0.06 since
almost everybody (97 per cents) belongs to the same ethnic group. Furthermore,
there are neither class struggles nor other reasons for social fragmentation. For
such a homogenous country, the theoretical model predicts that oil windfalls
should not cause much fighting. Hence, property rights should be effective and
the oil windfalls a blessing. Fortunately, these predictions fit the reality.21
Similarly, the model suggests that the much higher fighting intensity, the
weaker property rights and the much lower incomes in diamond-rich Angola
than in diamond-rich Botswana could be related to the fact that ethnic fraction-
alization is almost twice as high in Angola (0.79) as in Botswana (0.41), which
is among the ethnically least fractionalized countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.22
In addition to these casual observations, we have provided systematical em-
pirical support for the theoretical model’s predictions. In particular, we have
shown that the effect of natural resources on incomes is positive in ethnically
homogenous countries, but becomes increasingly negative as ethnic fractional-
ization increases. Hence, theory, empirical evidence and casual observations
suggest that natural resources tend to be a blessing with respect to incomes in
homogenous countries, but a curse in fractionalized countries.
There is some first evidence that the growth curse of natural resources might
also increase in ethnic fractionalization. To what extent this holds remains an
open question for future research.
Finally, the presented model offers policy implications that follow from the
similarity between natural resource windfalls and foreign aid windfalls: For-
eign aid payments might weaken property rights and reduce incomes in highly
fractionalized countries. Whether aid effectiveness depends indeed on fraction-
21In all other oil-exporting countries, ethnic fractionalization is considerably higher than
in Norway, but lower than in Nigeria. The presented model suggests that this might be the
reason why all other oil-exporting countries perform worse than Norway, but most of them
considerably better than Nigeria.
22Sierra Leone is another ethnically highly fractionalized (0.82), diamond-rich country with
an extraordinary poor performance.
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alization is another open question for future research. Svensson’s (2000) finding
that foreign aid increases corruption only in ethnically fractionalized countries
indicates that this might well be the case. However, aid payments to a frac-
tionalized country could potentially be successful if they were truly conditional
on cooperation among this country’s rivalling groups. Such an aid policy would
make collusion more attractive for the different groups.
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5 Appendices
5.1 Appendix A
In section 2, we solve the theoretical model under the assumption that the
property rights’ effectiveness is determined by equation (6). In this appendix,
we show that the results remain similar even if the effect of fighting activities
on property rights is considerably weaker, but non-zero.
Let us assume that the effectiveness of the property rights is given by
p = (1− λ) p +λ
(
1−
∑k
i=1 fi
X
)
, (14)
where 0 ≤p≤ 1 and 0 < λ ≤ 1. So, property rights still depend negatively on
the input share that is allocated to fighting activities, but this dependence is
now weaker (unless λ = 1). The exogenous component p might well represent
factors such as culture, legal traditions and constitutions.
By proceeding as in section 2, each group’s equilibrium fighting effort can
be shown to be
f∗ =
(k − 1)
[
(1− λ)
(
1− p
)
X + ωa
]
k [k − (k − 1) λ]
. (15)
Inserting f∗ into equation (14) would allow showing that the equilibrium
effectiveness of the property rights p∗ is still increasing in a and X as well as
decreasing in k and ω.
Further, it can be shown that the equilibrium per group income is
c∗ =
{
k − (k − 1)
[
λ + (1− λ)
(
1− p
)]}
aX + [1− (k − 1) λ]ω
[k − (k − 1) λ] k
.
Changes in a, k and X can be shown to have qualitatively the same effects on
equilibrium incomes as in section 2. In addition, equilibrium incomes increase
(decrease) in the natural resources ω if and only if the number of rivalling
groups k < (>) kcrit, where kcrit = 1+λλ . Hence, the threshold k
crit decreases
in λ. That is, it is the higher, the weaker the effect of fighting activities on
property rights is. Nevertheless, the income effect of the natural resources ω
becomes still negative if k becomes sufficiently large. But if property rights were
fully exogenous, i.e., if λ = 0, natural resources ω would always have a positive
effect on incomes independent of k.
5.2 Appendix B
5.2.1 Data Sources for Tables 1-4
In this appendix, we briefly describe the variables we use in the regressions
presented on the tables 1 to 4.
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NCS: The share of natural capital in the sum of physical, human and natural
capital in the year 1994, i.e., NCNC+PHC . Source: World Bank (1997)
NC: The per capita natural capital in the year 1994 in thousand US dollars
based on purchasing power parity and given a 4% discount rate. Source: World
Bank (1997)
PHC: The sum of per capita physical and human capital in the year 1994 in
thousand US dollars based on purchasing power parity and given a 4% discount
rate. Source: World Bank (1997)
ETHN: The index of ethnic fractionalization. Source: Alesina et al. (2003)
FRAC: A dummy variable that is equal to 1 for countries with ETHN larger
than the mean and 0 otherwise.
LANG: The index of linguistic fractionalization. Source: Alesina et al. (2003)
REL: The index of religious fractionalization. Source: Alesina et al. (2003)
EFH: The index of economic freedom of the Heritage Foundation. Source:
O’Driscoll et al. (2003)
PRH: The rating of the property rights of the Heritage Foundation. Source:
O’Driscoll et al. (2003)
EFF: The summary economic freedom rating of the Fraser Institute. Source:
Gwartney and Lawson (2003)
PRF: The rating of ”the legal structure and the security of property rights”
of the Fraser Institute. Source: Gwartney and Lawson (2003)
GNIP: The per capita gross national income in the year 2000 in thousand
international dollars based on purchasing power parity. Source: World Bank
(2003)
GNIA: The per capita gross national income in the year 2000 in thousand
US dollars derived by the Atlas methodology. Source: World Bank (2003)
LATI: The absolute value of the latitude, scaled to take values between 0 and
1. Source: La Porta et al. (1999)
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5.2.2 Data Sources for Table 5
In this appendix, we briefly describe the variables we use in the regressions
presented on table 5. All variables, except ETHN , are taken from Sachs and
Warner (1997). Thus, see there for additional information.
Growth Rate: The average annual growth in real GDP divided by the eco-
nomically active population from 1970 to 1990.
PXI: The ratio of primary exports to total merchandising exports in 1970.
LGDP: The log of real GDP divided by the economically active population
in 1970.
SOPEN: The fraction of years over the period 1970-1990 in which the country
is rated as economically open.
LINV: The log of the ratio of real gross domestic investment to real GDP,
averaged over the period 1970-1989.
RL: The rule of law index from the International Country Risk Guide.
DTT: The average annual growth rate in the log of the external terms of trade
between 1970 and 1990. External terms of trade are defined as the ratio of an
export price index to an import price index.
ETHN: The index of ethnic fractionalization. Source: Alesina et al. (2003)
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Table 1: Estimating Property Rights 
 
Column: 1.1  1.2  1.3  1.4  
ETHN 1.340*** -2.207**   1.511*** 
  (0.454)  (0.915)    (0.430) 
LANG     0.711** 
      (0.335) 
NCS  2.815*** -4.014** 3.710*** 
  (1.000)  (1.930)  (0.974)  
NC/PHC       1.209** 
        (0.471) 
Intercept 1.991*** 6.874*** 2.171*** 2.058*** 
  (0.235)  (0.439)  (0.198)  (0.239) 
Observations 90  85  87  90 
R-squared 0.241  0.184  0.210  0.222  
Dependent variable: PRH in columns 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4; PRF in column 1.2. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicates significance at a 10%, 5%, 1% level. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Estimating Economic Freedom 
 
Column: 2.1  2.2  2.3  2.4    
ETH  0.594**  -0.918**   0.685*** 
  (0.219)  (0.372)    (0.210) 
LANG     0.524*** 
      (0.162) 
NCS  1.547*** -3.060*** 1.644*** 
  (0.489)  (0.935)  (0.454)  
NC/PHC       0.674*** 
        (0.243) 
Intercept 2.428*** 7.188*** 2.467*** 2.465*** 
  (0.119)  (0.153)  (0.095)  (0.120) 
Observations 90  85  87  90 
R-squared 0.235  0.281  0.243  0.212  
Dependent variable: ERH in columns 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4; ERF in column 2.2. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicates significance at a 10%, 5%, 1% level. 
 
 
Table 3: Estimating Incomes 
 
Column: 3.1  3.2  3.3  3.4  3.5    
NC  0.026  0.082*** 0.075**  0.048  0.068*** 
  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.025) 
FRAC*NC -0.106**      
  (0.043)       
ETHN*NC   -0.247** -0.224* 
    (0.099)  (0.121) 
LANG*NC       -0.189*  
        (0.102) 
REL*NC         -0.144*** 
          (0.044) 
PHC  0.094*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
ETHN     -0.417 
      (0.742) 
LANG       0.824 
        (0.627) 
REL          0.838 
          (0.644) 
Intercept -0.181  -0.104  -0.109  -0.700*  -0.852** 
  (0.187)  (0.221)  (0.365)  (0.367)  (0.356) 
Observations 92  92  92  89  92 
R-squared 0.977  0.978  0.978  0.975  0.976  
Dependent variable: GNIP. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicates significance at a 10%, 5%, 1% level. 
 
 
  
Table 4: Modifications and the Interaction terms 
 
Column:  4.1  4.2  4.3  4.4  4.5      
Row A:  -0.106** -0.247** -0.224*  -0.189*  -0.144*** 
Results from table 3 (0.043)  (0.099)  (0.121)  (0.102)  (0.044) 
Row B:  -0.140*** -0.385*** -0.583*** -0.571*** -0.370*** 
GNIA as dep. var. (0.052)  (0.130)  (0.186)  (0.164)  (0.095) 
Row C:   -0.093*** -0.264*** -0.281*** -0.244*** -0.184*** 
Control for LATI (0.031)  (0.048)  (0.057)  (0.092)  (0.067)  
Row D:  -0.119*** -0.249*** -0.247*** -0.226*** -0.294*** 
Non-OECD sample (0.021)  (0.050)  (0.078)  (0.082)  (0.101) 
This table reports interaction terms after certain modifications of the setting from table 3. This interaction term is 
FRAC*NC in column 4.1, ETHN*NC in 4.2 and 4.3, LANG*NC in 4.4 and REL*NC in 4.5. Thereby, it is 
controlled for ETHN in column 4.3, for LANG in 4.4, for REL in 4.5 and for PHC and an intercept in all columns.  
Row A replicates the results of table 3. In row B, GNIA replaces GNIP as dependent variable. In row C, it is 
controlled for LATI and LATI*NC. In row D, the sample is restricted to the 68 non-OECD countries.  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicates significance at a 10%, 5%, 1% level. 
 
Table 5: Estimating the Growth Rate 
 
Column 5.1  5.2  5.3  
PXI  -2.497*** -1.206  -0.543 
  (0.642)  (0.770)  (0.914) 
ETHN*PXI   -2.489*** -4.312** 
(0.807)     (2.028) 
LGDP -1.795*** -2.003*** -2.045*** 
  (0.248)  (0.243)  (0.247) 
SOPEN 1.359*** 1.546*** 1.609*** 
  (0.491)  (0.466)  (0.471) 
LINV  0.646*  0.489  0.455 
  (0.379)  (0.360)  (0.362) 
RL  0.354*** 0.370*** 0.376*** 
(0.127)  (0.120)  (0.112) 
DTT  0.157*** 0.197*** 0.202*** 
  (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.054)  
ETHN     1.526 
(1.557) 
Intercept 14.76*** 16.67*** 16.71***  
  (2.051)  (2.027)  (2.028)  
Observations 73  73  73 
R-squared 0.660  0.704  0.708  
Dependent variable: Growth rate. OLS regressions.  
Standard Errors in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicates significance at a 10%, 5%, 1% level. 
 
